Dünya Ticareti Veri Tabanı

Modern dünyamızda veri tutma işlemleri sayesinde ticaret bilgileri çok güvenilir bir hale gelmiştir. Fakat tarihi öğrenmek için kullandığımız İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesine uzanan küresel ticaret verileri eksik olmak ile birlikte, güvenilmezdir. Orijinali voxeu.org sitesinde yayıml

Modern dünyamızda veri tutma işlemleri sayesinde ticaret bilgileri çok güvenilir bir hale gelmiştir. Fakat tarihi öğrenmek için kullandığımız İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesine uzanan küresel ticaret verileri eksik olmak ile birlikte, güvenilmezdir. Orijinali voxeu.org sitesinde yayımlanmış olan bu yazıda bu sorunların önüne geçmek amacıyla hazırlanmış veriler ve açıklamaları bulunuyor. “Dünya Ticaret Tarihi Veritabanı,” 1800 yılından itibaren tutulmuş ihracat-ithalat verileri ile beraber 190 ürünün döviz ve nakliyat fiyatlarını da bulundurmaktadır. 1800’lü yıllardan beri Dünya ticaretinin nasıl değişmiş ve gelişmiş olduğunu görmek için makaleye aşağıda, orijinal dilinde erişebilirsiniz; keyifli okumalar dileriz! Since 2007, the apparently unstoppable growth of world trade has come to a halt, and the openness of the world economy has been stagnating, or even declining. The recent prospect of a trade war is fostering pessimism for the future. Some people are hinting at a repetition of the Great Depression. These historical parallels are fascinating, although somewhat risky. At the very least, one should know exactly what happened to trade in the past (Eichengreen and O’Rourken 2012). This is fairly easy for recent years, but the series available for the pre-1938 period are incomplete, obsolete, and sometimes just wrong. For this reason, we have started a research project on world trade from 1800 onwards. We reported a first set of results in a number of papers (Federico and Tena-Juanquito 2017a, 2017b, 2018a), also summing them up in two previous columns here at VoxEU.org (Federico and Tena-Juanquito 2016a, 2016b). In a nutshell, we have found that: Trade grew very fast in the ‘long 19th century’ from Waterloo to WWI, recovered from the wartime shock in the 1920s, and collapsed by about a third during the Great Depression. It grew at breakneck speed in the Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s and again, after a slowdown because of the oil crisis, from the 1970s to the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2007. The effect of the latter on trade growth is sizeable but almost negligible if compared with the joint effect of the two world wars and the Great Depression. However, the effects might become more and more comparable if the current trade stagnation continues. The distribution of world exports by continent and level of development remained fairly stable until WWI. During the Great Depression, Europe lost more than the rest of the world, and the peripheral countries (and Japan) gained, but these changes were largely reversed during the Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, by 1972 European countries and the ‘old rich’ (North Western European countries and the US) still accounted for over a half of world exports. Since then, changes in world shares have been large and, at least so far, permanent. The share of Asia rose from about a sixth to a third, at the expense of all other continents. Contrary to a widely held view, the current level of openness to trade is unprecedented in history. The export/GDP ratio at its 2007 peak was substantially higher than in 1913 and the difference is much larger if the denominators include only tradables (i.e. it is the value added in agriculture and industry). Furthermore, openness increased from 1830 to 1870 (the true first period of globalisation) and again from the mid-1970s to 2007, while it broadly stagnated both in the decades during the so-called first globalisation (1870-1913) and during the Gol…